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owned the whole and conveyed to himself and the other. The court
simply considered the former case a stronger one for holding that the
four unities do exist. But it seems obvious that it is not a stronger case
if it is conceived as one of simultaneous cross conveyances.
As to the objection that clear intention to create a joint tenancy
with survivorship does not govern the legal operation of the deed, the
court said that "there appears to be a trend away from strict ad-
herence to common law technicalities." And the court went on to say-
"The modern view appears to be the more sensible and logical: that
is where the intention is clear and unequivocal, permit to be done
directly, that which could be done indirectly. This would make
effectual the interest which the parties by their conveyance intended
to create, without regard to those technicalities descending from the
feudal period."'
This is the real basis for the court's decision and the only one on
which it can stand, since the attempt to reconcile the case with the
common-law principles is futile.
It is reiterated that the court's desire to give effect to the grantor s
intention is commendable, but if a serious contravention of common-
law rules is thereby entailed, the advantage would be outweighed by
the disadvantages. However, a just result can be attained in the case
without violating doctrines of the common law by applying principle
(1) above: the undivided half interest of each devolves upon both as
joint tenants at one and the same time. This justly disposes of the
problem without severe violence to common-law principles, and at the
same time gives effect to the intention of the grantor.
WUmZM RicE
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. THE "NO RIDERS" PROBLEM
A master is usually held liable for the injuries caused to others by
the tortious conduct of his servants when they are acting within the
scope of their employment.' This doctrine of respondeat superior,
which originated about the beginning of the eighteenth century2 is
one of the few relics remaining from the earliest rule governing tortious
conduct, which imposed on a man absolute liability for all injuries
caused by himself, his family, ins servants or even his inanimate prop-
' Supra, note 1 at 997.
'PESTATEMENT, AcENcy sec. 219 (1) (1933).
- TrFFANY, AoFcy 99 (2d ed. 1924).
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erty 3 The principle of respondeat superior basically imposes upon
one person liability for another s wrong and for this reason it has been
vigorously attacked as entailing liability without fault.4 Despite such
censure, however, the doctrine continues to be recognized by the
courts, although there is a tendency to restrict as much as possible the
hardships which it places upon the employer. As Mr. Mechem states,
quotmg from Wood's Treatise on Master and Servant:
"'The doctrine holding a master liable for the wrongful acts of Is
servant is in direct antagomsm with that broader doctrine, that
every person shall be held to answer for his own wrongs; therefore
it is regarded with much jealously by the courts, and is circumscribed
into as narrow limits as is consistent with the true interests of
society. r
The controlling factor in determining the masters liability for the
tortious act of his servant is whether the servant at the time was acting
withn the scope or course of hIs employment.6 This is usually a ques-
tion of fact,7 but the courts have held certain acts or conduct of the
servant to be outside the course of his employment as a matter of law
One situation where the scope of employment becomes a question of
lav is where the master places a vehicle in the control of his servant,
who, without authority to do so, allows a stranger to ride. The ques-
tion in such cases is whether the employee is acting within the scope
of hIs employment in relation to the rider, so as to render the em-
ployer liable to the mvitee if he is injured by the tortious acts of the
employee while the employee is on his master s business.
It is the purpose of this note to review briefly several of the numer-
ous cases which have involved this "No Riders" problem and the effect
of those decisions upon the doctrine of respondeat superior in Ken-
tucky
In a recent Kentucky case" an employee of a transfer company,
without authority to do so, allowed the plantiff, a boy of seventeen, to
ride with him while he was making a delivery with the company s
truck. In the process of unloading,9 the plaintiff was injured and
recovered a judgment against the transfer company On appeal the
'Ibid. See Wiomom, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 H1Aiv. L. 13Ev. 315
(1893).
'MEcE-M, Ac scy 326 n. 72 (3d ed. 1923).
'Ibid.
Old. at 351.
7 Id. at 352.8 Pinson Transfer Co. v. Music, 239 S. W 2d 477 (Ky. 1951).
'The court disposed of the question which arose from the fact that the
plaintiff was not merely riding in the truck but was helping unload it, by holding
that it made no difference as the driver had no authority to procure help and the
employer had no knowledge that the drivers engaged such help.
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court reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding that it was
error to deny the defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction at
the close of the plaintiff's evidence.i ° The court adopted the rule that
the employer is not responsible for injuries to a person permitted to
ride by an employee, who has no authority to extend such invitations,
unless the injuries are inflicted by tortious conduct of the employee
after he discovers the unauthorized rider in a position of peril. This
is but another way of stating the rule of law governing the "No Riders"
problem which was adopted by the Kentucky Court in the leading
case of Slusher v Hubble," where the court quoted with approval
from Corpus Juris:
"It is very generally held that a servant has no implied authority to
invite or permit a third person to nde on a horse or vehicle in his
charge and if, m so doing, the mvitee sustains injuries through the
negligence of the servant, the master will not be liable, as the servant
is not acting within the scope of his authority- In these circum-
stances, the master owes no duty to the invitee who is a trespasser
except to see that he is not wilfully or wantonly injured."'
Although these cases represent slightly different rules in that one
protects the unauthorized rider from negligent conduct after he is dis-
covered in a position of peril, while the other protects him from wilful
and wanton misconduct at any time, it is apparent that both of these
rules logically follow from the finding that the rider is a trespasser.
Once the rider is considered to be a trespasser, then a duty arises to
protect him, not only from wilful and wanton misconduct, but also
from negligent acts after he is discovered in a position of peril.13
In an early Kentucky case14 it had been decided that an unauthor-
ized mvitee of an employee was a trespasser to the employer and con-
sequently entitled to the same degree of protection as a trespasser. In
several later cases, however, no mention of that rule was made and it
simply was held that an employee m inviting another to go with him
was not acting within the scope of his employment and for that reason
the employer was not liable for the injuries sustained by the invitee as
a result of the employee's conduct."'
Thus we have presented two possible solutions to the problem: (1)
10 The court also reversed the decision because of erroneous instructions given
to the jury by the lower court.
"254 Ky. 595, 72 S.W 2d 39 (1934).
1239 C. J. 1304 (1925).
PRossER, TORTS 613 (1941).
" Kentucky Central R. R. Co. v. Gastineau s Adm'r., 83 Ky. 119 (1885).
" Wiggnton Studio, Inc., v. Reuters Adm r., 254 Ky. 128, 71 S.W 2d 14(1934); Electric Bakeries v. Stacys Admr., 252 Ky. 20, 66 S.W 2d 70 (1933);
Williams Adin r. v. Portsmouth By-Product Coke Co., 213 Ky. 96, 280 S.W 479
(1926); Armstrong s Adin r. v. Sumne & Ratterman Co., 211 Ky. 750, 278 S.W
111 (1925); Corrigan v. Hunter, 139 Ky. 315, 122 S.W 131 (1909).
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the invitee can be treated as a trespasser to the employer who owes
him a duty to protect him as a trespasser; or (2) the liability of the em-
ployer being limited to injuries inflicted in the course of employment,
and, the act of inviting others to ride not being in the course of em-
ployment, the employer is not liable even for the wilful or wanton acts
of his employee which caused injury to the mvitee. Let us examine
further these two possible solutions.
The leading case m which the employer was held liable to the un-
authorized rider for the wilful and wanton misconduct of his employee
is Higbee Co. v Jackson."' In that case the court reasoned that as the
employee had no authority to allow others to ride, the mvitee was an
fact a trespasser and entitled to the protection owed to a trespasser and
since the employee s wilful and wanton acts were committed in the
handling of the truck in the course of the master s business they were
acts for which the master was liable. The court maintained that any
other rule would place the invitee in a worse position if he asks the
driver for permission to ride than if he heedlessly lumps on and rides
without permission. The persuasive reasoning of this case had a sub-
stantial effect on the development of the law which governed the "No
Riders" problem and it soon became the rule which was followed in
many jurisdictions.1t
The fact that the decision in the Higbee case was adopted in most
jurisdictions as a satisfactory solution to the problem is not as m-
portant as the fact that the rule whch the case promulgated was ex-
pressly overruled by the same court within 10 years.is In the latter case
the court held that the employer was not liable to the unauthorized
rider for wrongful conduct of his employee even though such conduct
might be classified as wilful and wanton. The court admitted that the
nder was an mvitee of the employee and a trespasser of the employer,
however, being a trespasser to the employer inposed only a personal
duty not to wilfully injure him. The wilful, reckless, and wanton mis-
conduct of the employee, who was not acting within the course of his
employment in relation to the mvitee, could not make his employer
liable by such conduct.
It is submitted that this latter expression of opinion by the Ohio
court is the soundest solution to this problem. In determining whether
or not the courts should impose liability on the employer in such
situations it is necessary to keep in mind several factors: (1) the
employer has as a general rule expressly forbidden the employee to
16 101 Ohio St. 75, 128 N.E. 61 (1920).
'17Bobos v. Krey Packing Co., 317 Mo. 108, 296 S.W 157 (1927); Zavodnick
v. A. Rose & Son, 297 Pa. 86, 146 AtI. 455 (1929); See the extensive annotation
in 14 A.L.R. 145 (1921); 39 C.J. 1304 (1925).
"
8 Unon Gas & Electric Co. v. Crouch, 123 Ohio St. 81, 174 N.E. 6 (1930).
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allow others to ride;' 9 (2) the rider usually has notice, through "No
Riders" signs or common knowledge, that the driver has no authority
to allow him to ride; (3) the injured rider will have an action against
the driver so he is not left without redress;20 and (4) last, but by far
the most important, is the fact that the whole doctrine of respondeat
superior places liability on one individual for the wrongs committed
by another and such a doctrine should be applied with caution and
circumspection.
The problem which has been discussed in this note is indeed very
difficult. It would be impossible to say categorically that either one of
the solutions is wrong, for both can be supported by reason and author-
ity It is clear, however, that the solution adopted and followed by
the Kentucky court, in its latest decisions, is that the employer will
be liable for the injuries inflicted upon the rider by his employee when
they are of such a character as would render one liable to a trespasser.
ROBERT C. MOFFrr
RIGHT OF PRIVACY COLLECTION CASES - LETTER OF
CREDITOR TO DEBTOR'S EMPLOYER
In the recent case of Voneye v Turner,' the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals was confronted with a question arising from the actions of a
zealous creditor in his attempt to collect a debt. The court held that
the creditor could write to the debtor s employer requesting his as-
sistance in the collection of the debt without making himself liable in
an action for the invasion of the debtor s right of privacy
It is the purpose of this note to present the current position of the
courts on the question of the right of privacy in the process of debt
collection, and the extent to which the courts have held certain
methods employed by creditors to be invasions of the individual's
right of privacy Although this note will not cover all acts which con-
"The fact that the act was forbidden does not of itself relieve the master of
liability but it should be considered m determining the scope of employment.
Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 68 N.W 19 (1896); Lnpus v. London Omnibus
Co., 1 H. & C. 526, 158 Eng. Rep. 993 (Ex. 1862); TIFFANY, AGENCY 109 (2d ed.
1924).
' The lack of financial responsibility of the servant is usually stated as the
reason for supporting the doctrine of respondeat superior. MECHEM, AGENCY 828
(3d 1923). However it would seem that this consideration should not be as
controlling today as it was when tis doctrine originated, for employees today are
financially much stronger than were the slaves and servants of the eighteenth cen-
tury
'814 Ky. - 240 S.W 2d 588 (1951).
